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Dilbert-Peter model of organization effectiveness: computer simulations
Pawel Sobkowicz∗
(Dated: November 8, 2018)
We provide a technical report on a computer simulation of general effectiveness of a hierarchical
organization depending on two main aspects: effects of promotion to managerial levels and efforts
to self-promote of individual employees, reducing their actual productivity. The combination of
judgment by appearance in the promotion to higher levels of hierarchy and the Peter Principle
(which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence) results in fast declines in
effectiveness of the organization. The model uses a few synthetic parameters aimed at reproduction
of realistic conditions in typical multilayer organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer simulations have become increasingly
popular in describing social phenomena, from traffic
jams to opinion formation. The number of topics and
works is very large and there are even popular exposi-
tions of the discipline, such as Ball [1]. In some cases
the new tools provide significant insight into observed
phenomena. Unfortunately, sometimes the computer
simulations and statistical mechanics serve the same
purposes as described by Andreski [2], namely to for-
tify work that is trivial from sociological point of view.
There is also another pitfall resulting from the focus
on the mathematical and computer tools, namely min-
imal reference to the actual social observations. With
these dangers in mind it seems quite adventurous to
propose a mathematical model of purely social phe-
nomena, especially well established in descriptive so-
ciology.
An example of such work, where computer model
genuinely allows to go beyond traditional description,
is a recent publication by Pluchino et al. [3], who
have provided a simple and interesting simulation of
the famous Peter Principle (Peter and Hull [4]). The
principle results from observation that in any hierar-
chical organization global effectiveness is diminished
due to the fact often skills which make a person an
excellent worker at a given level in the organization
may be unsuited at a higher one. Thus, promotion
of the best employees (which looks like a reasonable
way of action) results in loss of skilled workers and,
possibly, creation of less than optimal managers. Of
course, such ineffective manager would no longer be
promoted, so eventually everyone would become stuck
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at their level of incompetence. Peter originally for-
mulated this idea in a joke-like fashion, but once we
recognize its importance, it becomes pretty obvious
and common sense. There are several works provid-
ing more exact description of the effects of the prin-
ciple, for example Kane [5], Fairburn and Malcomson
[6], Lazear [7, 8]. It should be noted that companies
fight against the “incompetence stasis” resulting from
the Peter Principle via constant pressure on employ-
ees: promoting the best is usually accompanied by
firing the worst performers at each level of hierarchy.
But while this leads to culling of non-performers, it
might mean loss of capable lower level employees who
have been promoted beyond their skill range. The
process creates a bad manager from a good worker,
and then gets rid of the bad manager. This problem
can in turn be solved by providing horizontal career
paths, which ensure that the best specialists could be
recognized and awarded without changing the area of
their tasks, so that their skills would not be lost upon
promotion. Yet, despite the fact that Peter Principle
is known for forty years, examples of loss of produc-
tivity due to promoting people beyond their capacities
are present in almost all types of hierarchical organi-
zations, from scientific research to commercial compa-
nies.
In our model we attempt to go beyond the earlier
approaches, which assume that the basis for promo-
tions is the actual performance of the organization
members. Our motivation comes from experience that
decisions to hire and promote are based on perceived
performance. Thus, employees or external candidates
who focus on presenting themselves and their own
results in good light (instead of just working) have
better chances of advancement. Such individual pub-
lic relations activity or self-promotion is quite nat-
ural and present everywhere: in commercial compa-
nies, universities or political parties. The result is
that not only people reach their incompetency level,
2but also that the whole promotion process often fo-
cuses on those who have little to contribute to the
organization but rather spend their effort and time
on getting promoted. In honor of the Scott Adams’
Dilbert comic strip (Adams [9]), we propose to call
the resulting process Dilbert-Peter Principle. Simi-
lar combination of the two phenomena, which limit
the effectiveness of organizations, has been proposed
by Faria [10]. It might seem to be presumptuous
to use Pointy Haired Boss and other characters fea-
tured in the Dilbert strip as “real world” basis for
computer modelling. Would it not be better to use
official company data, histories and performance fig-
ures as a source for inspiration for a simulation model?
In our opinion, just the contrary. The official docu-
ments are usually written with the purpose of hiding
the very mistakes and ineffectiveness we want to dis-
cuss. On the other hand, due to the popularity of the
strip and its WEB site (http://www.dilbert.com/),
the accumulated “database” of cases of stupidity and
mismanagement is much better and true to life than
the official corporate profiles and annual reports. The
author’s personal experience, gathered in several com-
panies, Polish, American, German and French, sug-
gests that what looks like jokes is often an uncannily
accurate description modern business organizations.
Thousands of letters sent to Scott Adams from all over
the world confirm this experience. In many areas we
find organizations which share similar activities, sizes
and structures, yet which differ widely in their effec-
tiveness. This is true for both commercial companies
and public organizations. Our goal is to find which
which aspects of the model are crucial in determina-
tion of the overall productivity, and perhaps to suggest
measures to improve the operations in real life.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The purpose of the model is to provide a simplified
description of effectiveness of a hierarchical organiza-
tion in which people act to maximize their promo-
tion chances. The promotions are achieved through
comparisons of productivity of individuals within a
given hierarchy level. One of the key differentiators
of the model is the division between real productivity
(for example sales results, number of research pub-
lications, lines of code accepted into a project) and
employee productivity perception by the authorities
responsible for making promotion decisions. While
the effectiveness of the whole organization is measured
by accumulating the real output of the contributors,
their advancement within the organization is related
to comparative perceived results. Observations show
that often it is not the best performer that gets pro-
moted (as postulated by the original Peter Principle)
but those who appear to be the best workers. There
are thus two main strategies to achieve the promo-
tion. The first is via improvement of the real output,
which corresponds directly to the Peter model back-
ground. The second way, observed all too frequently,
is through the use of political games, thanks to which
a person appears to be more productive and worthy of
advancement. These individual PR activities are done
at the expense of the actual work, thereby decreasing
the contribution of the individual to the overall orga-
nizational effectiveness.
Following Pluchino et al. [3] we propose to com-
pare two possible scenarios, differing in description
of individual productivity after the promotion. The
first one, called continuity scenario (‘common sense’
in Pluchino et al. [3]), in which the productivity at
the new post is similar to the one at the previous one.
Such situation is expected when the range of tasks re-
lated to the new position remains similar to the pre-
vious ones. The Peter scenario assumes that due to
difference in tasks at different levels of the organiza-
tion the productivity at the new post is unrelated to
the old one. In both cases our current model measures
the perceived productivity, including effects of inter-
nal politics. We investigate the effects of promotion
process on key characteristics of the organization: its
general productivity, averages of effectiveness at var-
ious levels of the hierarchy, dynamics of changes due
to the promotion preferences.
The simulations presented here are designed to in-
clude several phenomena associated with modern en-
terprises and organizations, namely hierarchical orga-
nization, management contribution, measurements of
effects dependent on both individual qualities and cu-
mulative results of subordinates and interplay between
in-company promotion and external hiring. The goal
of the model is to provide some predictions regard-
ing the dependence of the measured qualities on a few
simple controls: importance of the political games-
manship for promotion, heritability of skills after pro-
motion (the continuity model versus Peter hypothesis)
and tendency for internal or external advancement.
The basic model applies to organizations in which
activities are uniform, i.e. where the nature of tasks
is the same for all positions at a given hierarchy level.
Examples might be provided by some government in-
3stitutions (such as tax offices), research institutions
or by specialized parts of larger bodies, for example
sales divisions in large corporations. While the basic
tasks and measurement criteria per level are compara-
ble throughout the organization, advancing from one
level to another might change (sometimes very signif-
icantly) the nature of the job: from tax collection or
sales to management, more and more remote from the
outside world as we move up in hierarchy
Presented results are based on a small number of
selected conditions and, we hope, can be a starting
point for a more advanced study.
A. Hierarchical structure
We are interested here in department based hierar-
chical organizations, such as a commercial company
with many local sales offices, or large software house
with multiple project teams. To a certain degree this
description applies to research and government insti-
tutions as well. The simplest way of modeling such
organization is via pyramid structure of units of the
same size. Organization is divided into K levels, num-
bered from top (k = 1). Each unit consists of a man-
ager at level k and N subordinates (workgroup) at
level k + 1.
The size of the whole organization is thus NTOT =
(NK − 1)/(N − 1). To achieve reasonable number
of levels and unit sizes we may restrict ourselves to
N ≤ 10 and K = 4 or K = 5, resulting in organiza-
tions with enough structure but limited to about 1000
people.
B. Agent characteristics
1. Real work and self-promotion
Employees are represented by computer agents
numbered via subscript i. Each agent is character-
ized by two parameters. The first, wi, is its capacity
to perform effective work at its current position, called
also raw productivity. We consider here two types of
contributions: direct work (for example value of sales
achieved by a salesman, lines of code written by a
programmer or research papers published by a scien-
tist) and managerial contribution, related to organiz-
ing, coaching and monitoring efforts of others. Man-
agers, by their actions, may significantly influence the
sum of individual results of their subordinates. This
would correspond, to use our examples, to overall sales
figures for a branch office, code submitted by a soft-
ware development group or the research standing of
the institute. We have decided to combine the two
contributions into one parameter, to keep the spirit of
Peter principle, defining one "competence".
The second characteristics of an agent is the ef-
fort he or she puts into internal political positioning
(self-promotion) denoted by pi. This parameter may
include activities and skills that are quite common-
place in modern organizations, for example excessive
focus on presentation of results compared to the actual
value of one’s own results (“PowerPoint economy”),
presenting other’s achievements in bad light, forming
and nurturing of cliques and power circles. We con-
sider here that pi is focused on personal interest of
the agent and does not contribute to actual results
– neither those related to direct output, nor to man-
agement contributions. In this work we separate the
“productive” part of political activities (such as or-
ganizing, motivating, ensuring cooperation. . . ), being
an inherent part of management activities and con-
tributing to the real work done, from activities aimed
at personal gain.
In our simulations we assume that the wi is drawn
from Gaussian distribution centered around w0 (a
good value for w0 might be 1, for reasons explained
in Section II B 2) with distribution width of σw, while
for pi the distribution is linear from 0 to pmax. The
two parameters are used to model the actual results
of the work done by the agent and the perception of
the work done within the organization. The effective
contribution to the organization productivity by the
agent is given by
w′i = wi − pi (1)
This is the simplest way of describing the fact that
focusing on improving one’s own position by politi-
cal activities must deduct some time from the actual
work. On the other hand, effort spent on political
maneuvers improves the perceived results. This is de-
scribed in a more complex way, depending on addi-
tional parameter: organization’s susceptibility to self-
promotion (Eq. 3). Similar trade-off between techni-
cal and social skills has been proposed by Faria [10].
It should be noted, however, that in our approach wi
contains both the technical and social skills as defined
by Faria. The change of responsibility upon promo-
tion might result in a different optimal ratio of the
two types of skills, and therefore, in different value of
wi before and after promotion. The treatment of pi
4is different: it measures an internal characteristic of a
person, its drive to improve own position, which does
not improve the actual results in any way and has not
been considered in the past. We have used values of
w0 = 1, σw = 0.3, pmax = 0.6 in the simulations.
This choice has been motivated by real life observa-
tions: for example such distribution of wi allows dif-
ferences of work in the range of 200% or even more.
As for pi, the choice of flat distribution rather than
Gaussian reflects relatively frequent cases of extreme
behavior: total lack of focus on self-promotion, or just
the opposite. Author experiences lead to assumption
of pmax = 0.6; there are people who do spend more
than half of time on political ploys aimed to advance
their position.
2. Management contribution
To take into account the fact that in most organi-
zations managers are measured on the results of the
teams they manage, we introduce here accumulated
versions of the effective work and perceived results,
which combine the results of the manager and his
or her subordinates. We have chosen to use a multi-
plicative way of describing the influence of the man-
ager on the results of the department. This is by no
means the only choice, but it provides a simple way
of describing situation where a bad manager (w′i < 1)
would actually decrease the overall output of his de-
partment, while the good manager (w′i > 1) would
increase it. This multiplicative approach differs from
additive view of Pluchino et al. [3], who propose that
contributions at higher levels of hierarchy should be
modelled by simple addition of manager’s results mul-
tiplied by an artificial factor ranging from 0.2 at the
lowest level to 1.0 at the top management, to simu-
late the increased importance of the higher levels of
hierarchy. Increase of productivity of given employee
over time is a real phenomenon found in many or-
ganizations, related with accumulation of skills and
experiences. It would describe a horizontal progress
from an apprentice to a top specialist – within a given
level of hierarchy. It is less suited to vertical promo-
tion and managerial tasks, where the contribution of a
manager comes from organizing the work of the subor-
dinates. Moreover, additive approach can not describe
the Dilbertian influence of idiot bosses who often de-
crease the results of the departments they manage.
The importance of the individual contribution must
be higher as we move up in the organization levels.
Thus we propose that effective results are given by
Wi = w
′
i ×

 ∑
j∈SUB(i)
Wj

 , (2)
where SUB(i) denotes the agents that are directly
managed by agent i. Due to recursive nature of the
above expression, the effective results of a manager i
include contributions of all its subordinates. For the
lowest level of hierarchy Wi = w
′
i. In such model, if
all agents have the same value of wi = 1 and pi = 0
(no effort is wasted on political positioning) the re-
sults at a given layer k are NK−k, assigning much
greater importance to the managers that in the addi-
tive model. But if w′i < 1 then the manager decreases
the summed contributions of his or hers subordinates.
Such model does not describe well situations where
a manager combines the managerial tasks with the
same type of production as his or her subordinates
(e.g. programming team leader writing code, univer-
sity department head doing his or her own research
or sales manager being directly responsible for some
customers). However, above certain realistic size of
the workgroup, the qualitative results of our model
remain unchanged by such assumption.
In contrast with the actual results, the perceived
outcome for a manager is given by a combination of
the real results of his department (compared to the ex-
pected average at the appropriate level) and the out-
come of his political ploys. We have used a simple
sum of these two factors
Ui = Wi/W (k) + C · pi, (3)
where W (k) is the average result at the level of the
agent i. C is a numerical factor used to model self-
promotion importance - one of the key parameters in
the simulations. We use the name “susceptibility” for
C, as it determines the relative importance of self-
promotion in the selection of candidates for promo-
tion, and thus the way the organization responds to
self interests of employees. Such form of the perceived
results allows normalization of its two components in-
dependently of the level, number of subordinates etc.
Agents with highest and lowest values of Ui would
be the candidates for promotion and sacking, respec-
tively. Figure 1 shows sample organizational structure
with K = 4 and N = 4, comparing Wi and Ui at vari-
ous levels of the organization. The positions are color
coded, with highest values denoted by green, lowest
by red. As may be seen, actual performance and per-
ceived one may be quite different.
5Using the assumptions about the distribution of
raw output wi and self-promotion pi described in Sec-
tion II B 1, it is possible to calculate the average ac-
tual and perceived results at each organization level
in a situation where the capabilities of each agent are
drawn randomly
W (k)RANDOM = N
(K−k) w
′(K−k+1)
R , (4)
where
w′R = w0 − pmax/2. (5)
The overall outcome of the political activities on the
real and perceived results of an agent at a given posi-
tion are simply: increase of pi leads to decrease of real
contribution but increase of the perceived one. De-
pending on the value of C playing politics may prove
to be advantageous - or not. As it turns out the result
depends on the level of the organization, making the
model more life-like.
C. Promotion, firing and hiring
To model the processes of promotion in an organi-
zation we need to provide some assumptions as to the
personnel mobility within it. This requires balanc-
ing between model simplicity and the need to cover
realistic situations. The rules proposed apply to or-
ganization levels k ≥ 2. For the top level, there is
no competition and no hiring/firing. Real organiza-
tions certainly experience changes at the CEO level,
and such changes can bring large differences in the
overall performance. Charismatic leaders, like Steve
Jobs, by their vision and management skills can rad-
ically change the evolution of their companies. Such
contributions are, however, impossible to simulate in
a statistical computer model. Our goal is to model in-
ternal competition and promotion mechanisms within
an organization, coming from lower levels. To allow
such focus in our simulations we have assumed that
the top manager has no influence on the overall pro-
ductivity, having w1 = 1, and p1 = 0.
At lower levels the firing and promotion scheme eas-
ier to simulate. At the end of every quarter there
is some chance (given by parameter xf ) that from
each workgroup ofN employees subordinate to a given
manager one would be fired. Thus the typical churn
rate is the same at every level, being given by xf/N ,
and the reason for introducing xf is to allow adjust-
ment of the rate of change in the model. This would
allow the “simulation time” to reflect actual time for
real organizations. The choice of the agent to be fired
in each workgroup is deterministic: the worst per-
ceived performer is selected as the candidate for firing.
We have also considered a variant in which a man-
ager threatened by a possibility of being fired, if suffi-
ciently skilled in political games, might pass the blame
to one of his or her direct reports. In this variant, the
existence of scapegoats further improves the chances
of those agents who focus on politics instead of the
real work. However, such blame-shifting requires high
political skills, so we have assumed that it would be
possible only with probability proportional the politi-
cal skills of the threatened manager, pi. For low values
of pi putting the blame to others would be virtually
impossible, but for those who have high values pf pi
closer to 1, the security of the manager in question
would be greatly improved, at the expense of his sub-
ordinates. So, in blame-shifting scenario, survival role
of pi is enhanced.
The vacant positions can be filled either by inter-
nal promotion or by external hiring. This can by
described by assuming two mechanisms of filling a
given empty post, each with probability being a part
of the model. First, there is a probability that the
post will be filled by externally hired agent (proba-
bility xe). To keep the model close to the real hir-
ing process we assume that for each vacant position
some applicants with randomly drawn values of wi
and piwould be compared (we used 4 candidates in
the simulations). But it is important to remember
that this process would compare the perceived quali-
ties of the candidates. The same political skills that
are used during employment may be a rough mea-
sure of how the candidate presents his or her past
achievements and value for the future employer. So,
the hired agent would be the one with the highest
value of w′i/(w0− pmax/2)+C · pi. It seems a reason-
able assumption that the same susceptibility factor C
that is used to describe the organization’s susceptibil-
ity to political maneuvering of the employees would
be used for appraisal of candidates. We have also run
simulations where no selection of external candidates
has been performed and thus the new agent would
simply have a random set of wi, pi values. This al-
lows to study the effects of pre-selection of external
candidates.
The second option of filling a vacancy is through di-
rect promotion of the best performer (again, we mea-
sure perceived performance!) of the organizational
level directly below the vacancy. It is possible to con-
6Figure 1: Examples of organizations from simulation program. Organization has 4 levels and workgroup size N is also 4.
In the left panel colors correspond to true performance Wi, in the right panel colors correspond to perceived performance
Ui; green for highest performers in given level, red for lowest values, normalized for each level.
sider two options: local promotion, where the pro-
moted agent is selected from direct subordinates under
the vacated position, and global where anyone from
the lower level can be picked to fill the vacated post.
In the preliminary results presented here the global
model has been used. The promotion will, of course,
leave another vacancy to be filled at a lower level. The
hiring process should start at the highest vacancy and
continue down. All the vacancies at the lowest level
are, by their nature, filled by external hiring.
To make the model comparable to previous ‘Peter
Principle’ studies two options of treating the agent ca-
pacities after a promotion are possible. They are: the
continuity hypothesis, in which the productivity at
the higher level remains close to the previous one
w+i = wi + δw, (6)
where w+i denotes agents capacity on the higher level.
Agent’s productivity changes by a small random value
of δw, with normal distribution centered at zero with
width of σδw. This hypothesis would be applicable to
situations where the tasks at the higher hierarchy level
are somewhat similar to those at a lower level (ad-
vancement from programmer to programming team
leader, for example). On the other hand, in situations
where the new post calls for totally different set of
skills (salesman promoted to sales manager or to mar-
keting manager position) it is sensible to assume the
Peter hypothesis in which w+i is randomly drawn,
without any relation to previous wi. For this reason
the promotion modes (local or global) and the promo-
tion hypotheses (common sense or Peter hypothesis)
might be correlated.
Depending on the organization the change of the
scope of activity due to promotion, from direct pro-
duction (writing the code, visiting customers, con-
ducting experiments) to managerial tasks of organiz-
ing, planning and supervision may be more or less
gradual. The first promotion, turning a worker into
first line manager introduces the greatest change and
one could expect that Peter hypothesis to hold. On
the other hand further promotions may involve the
use of more or less the same set of managerial skills
applied to larger groups and responsibilities, which
would be better described by the common sense ap-
proach. It might make sense then to introduce a
mixed model corresponding to such situation.
D. Simulation considerations
During simulation process we are looking both at
global changes of organization effectiveness depend-
ing on the promotion model as well as individual ca-
reer paths and results of individual strategies (given
by unchanging values of the political factor pi of each
agent). The simulation steps should correspond to
realistic conditions, e.g. quarters or semesters – pe-
riods where typically performance of employees is re-
viewed. Thus we would be interested in, say, up to
64 steps (16 years) – but many of the interesting phe-
nomena could happen on the shorter timescales. By
experience, modern commercial organizations stay in
the same shape (without major reorganizations) for
7periods of 3-5 years. And, of course, major reorga-
nizations are not covered by the simplistic model de-
scribed above. The individual results of the simula-
tion runs differed significantly (as discussed in Section
IIIA) and we for each combination of parameters we
have accumulated results of 8000 runs, to obtain av-
erages and distribution of key characteristics.
The key parameters and characteristics of the sim-
ulated organization were:
• Overall performance of the organization, given
by the averages of effective total result of the
topmost boss WTOT =W1 and its changes dur-
ing simulation steps, as well as effective perfor-
mances of organization units at different levels,
as given by their bosses’ Wi. We also recorded
the number of new hires compared to internal
promotions, to check the initial assumptions It
is worth noting that these parameters are com-
parable to real world data, ans such comparison
could lead to improvements of the model (for ex-
ample probabilities of external hiring depending
on the level of the vacancy).
• Monitoring true productivity and self-
promotion factor at various levels of the
organization. Average 〈pi〉k for each level k
as well as the average value of raw individual
productiveness 〈wi〉k were calculated at each
step of the simulations; to check if it is the
political manipulators or the real workers who
move to the upper echelons, as suggested by
common sense.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The model presented in this work is rather com-
plex, involving several parameters designed to mimic
at least some of the crucial aspects of modern orga-
nizational life. This complexity, however, makes de-
riving clear dependencies rather difficult. For the pur-
pose of this preliminary paper we decided to divide the
system controls into two groups. The first contains
those that are static between various simulations, for
example the distributions of wi and pi. For most of
the simulations we have also kept the firing rate xf
and the external hiring rate xe fixed. The values of
these parameters were selected to keep the “simulation
time” as close as possible to the real world, and obtain
reasonable values of the churn ratio and average time
spent as given position.
The second group contained controls that were var-
ied between simulated organizations, describing their
main characteristics: number of levels and workgroup
size, presence or absence of blame-shifting, pere-
selection sample size for external candidates and, of
course, type of post-promotion efficiency model (Peter
hypothesis, continuity model) and organization sus-
ceptibility to self-promotion.
We present here results for two hierarchies, the first
comprised of 5 levels of 5 people in a workgroup, the
second of only 4 levels but 9 people in a workgroup.
This choice was motivated by a desire to keep the
overall sizes of the two configurations similar (781 in
the first case, 820 in the second). Also, the number
of workers in the lowest (non-managerial) level was of
the same order (625 vs. 729). Based on the distribu-
tion of wi and pi defined in Section 2, we can derive
two “yardstick” measures of the total organization pro-
ductivity. The first, which we would call “neutral pro-
ductivity”, assumes that no self-promotion take place
(pi = 0) and that all workers and managers have the
same effective w′i = wi = 1. Then the organization’s
output is simply given by the number of lowest level
workers (as managers neither improve nor diminish
the results). The other standard is the average pro-
ductivity in a wholly random organization, this time
including the negative effects of time and effort lost
on political games. The values of such static, random
distribution are, with our choice of parameters, rather
low, (105 for the 5-by-5 case and 175 for the 4-by-9
one). This is, of course, due to the largely negative
impact of the managerial structure, where every man-
ager decreases the production of his/her department
by a factor of w′R = w0 − pmax/2 (0.7 in our case).
These values are also starting points of the results of
the dynamical simulations, as the starting conditions
used random distribution of agent characteristics. It
should be noted that the random configuration and
associated productivity seems highly unrealistic, as
it means that all managers negatively influence the
outcome. For this reason, we have used the neutral
productivity as the criterion of the improvement vs.
decline of the organization effectiveness in the simu-
lations. Interestingly enough, some combinations of
parameters resulted in configurations that were worse
than the random one – negative selection is real, es-
pecially if the organization itself is under no threat of
existence nor competition, as is often true for govern-
ment structures.
Despite the fact that in all simulations the pool of
agents’ individual capabilities remained the same, the
8final long term results of the model organizations var-
ied by almost an order of magnitude! At the end of
this report we include detailed average results of the
simulations for several combinations of model param-
eters (Figures 13 to 23). Due to the interplay of the
processes introduced in our model, separation of the
individual contributions is not easy and the impact
of various model parameters requires some detailed
analysis.
A. Simulation statistics
Due to the multiplicative way the managerial con-
tribution is modelled here, the influence of individual
characteristics of managers, especially at high posi-
tions, can significantly change the overall productivity
of the organization. As a result we observe rather wide
distribution of results between simulation runs. As
an example, Figure 2 presents distribution functions
of overall productivity WTOT for the Peter model for
various values of the susceptibility factor C, at differ-
ent stages of the evolution starting from random con-
figuration: after3, 5 and 16 years. Figure 3 presents
similar data for a set of simulations in the continuity
model.
The widths of the distributions are rather high, with
half-width at half-maximum strongly correlated with
the position of the peak center (Fig. 4). In the conti-
nuity model we observe strong reduction of the width
of the distribution of WTOT with the passage of time,
but even after 16 years of continuous evolution, there
are still significant differences of results between in-
dividual simulation runs. Thus, part of the trends
observed for average values as functions of model pa-
rameters, discussed in the later part of this article,
may be masked by individual differences between sim-
ulation runs. We note here that the average values of
〈pi〉k and 〈wi〉k for organization level k have similar
Gaussian distributions.
B. Evolution of individual agent characteristics
We note first that the behavior of the lowest and
the mid-range hierarchy levels is different. This is due
to radically different mechanisms of changes in the
agents occupying these levels. The ratio of vacated
positions to level size was set as constant for levels
below the topmost. It should be noted, however, that
the lowest level is filled entirely from outside, which
leads to strong dependence of the average character-
istics of agents on that level on the external hiring
process – especially on the results of selection of the
external candidates.
The most straightforward effects are due to the
presence or absence of selection of external candi-
dates. We have compared results when only one ex-
ternal candidate is randomly drawn (denoted 1NH)
and when the candidate with best perceived value of
w′i/(w0 − pmax/2) + C · pi expected productivity is
chosen from four candidates (denoted 4NH). With-
out selection the expected values of wi and pi for the
newly hired employees would be w0 and pmax/2, re-
spectively. As Fig. 5 shows, allowing the organization
to choose from only 4 candidates significantly influ-
ences the resulting values of wi and pi and the re-
sulting productivity. Such increase in the real pro-
ductivity w′i of newhires is especially important for
the lowest level of organization. For the Peter model,
where only pi are kept by an agent upon promotion,
the increases of wi are largely lost at higher levels.
For the continuity model both pi and wi are inherited
and, as the new hires participate in later promotion
possibilities the values obtained with pre-selection on
higher levels also show an increase compared with sim-
ple random values for external hiring. As a result,
the overall performance of the organization WTOT is
higher in the 4NH case than in the 1NH case for both
Peter model and continuity model, but the difference
is much higher for the continuity model (50-70% com-
pared to 10-40%, see Fig.6).
The blame-shift process during which managers can
place the responsibility for the department weak per-
formance on one of their subordinates acts in a more
subtle way. First, it extends the lifetime of managers,
especially the ones with weak real performance but
high values of pi. Because we have assumed the proba-
bility of using a scapegoat to be given by manager’s pi
(and independent on C) the effect is the strongest for
low values of C, where it leads to much larger average
values of pi at mid-managerial levels for small C. This
is especially visible early in the simulations, within the
first 3 years of organization evolution from the random
initial state. The overall effects of the possibility to
shift the blame for weak performance are different for
the continuity and Peter models (see Fig. 7). For the
Peter model there is a general but small decrease in
organization productivity when blame-shifting is pos-
sible. For the continuity model there is a large de-
crease of productivity in initial stages that gets grad-
ually compensated at later times, so that for large C
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Year 3, 4NH, no blameshift
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
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Year 5, 4NH, no blameshift
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
WTOT
Year 16, 4NH, no blameshift
Figure 2: Distribution of WTOT values for Peter model (organization with 5 levels with 5 positions in a workgroup)
depending on C value after 3, 5 and 16 years. Probabilities of WTOT are very well described by Gaussian distributions.
Increased values of C shift the center of the distribution to smaller values and decrease the width of the distribution –
top left curves in each panel correspond to C = 5, bottom right to C = 0.01. The distributions were displaced vertically
for clarity for increasing C values.
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Figure 3: Distribution of WTOT values for continuity model (organization with 5 levels with 5 positions in a workgroup)
depending on C value after 3, 5 and 16 years. Probabilities of WTOT are very well described by Gaussian distributions.
The distributions were displaced vertically for clarity for increasing C values.
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Figure 4: Correlations between the maximum of the WTOT distribution in multiple simulation runs and the width of
the distribution. Simulations for Peter and continuity models with 5 levels and 5 positions in a workgroup, pre-selection
between four candidates in external hiring and no blame-shifting. Point series correspond to situation after 3 and 16
years, and each series is given by different susceptibility C values, ranging from C = 5 at bottom left corner to C = 0.01
at the top right corner.
values the overall productivity in organizations allow-
ing blame shifting becomes even greater than for those
that do not allow this process.
The time evolution of average values of 〈wi〉k and
〈pi〉k for various organization levels are – for most
parameter combinations – reasonably well described
by exponentially decaying functions of time w(t) ≈
wmax + (w0 − wmax) exp(−t/Tw) and p(t) ≈ pmax +
(p0 − pmax) exp(−t/Tp). For very low values of C the
self-promotion is selected against, thus pi decreases
with time for both continuity and Peter models. For
large values of C > 2 selection favors high political ac-
tivity and thus pi grows. In the intermediate regime
of 0.5 < C < 1.5 we observe more complex behavior
of pi, remaining close to the average value for random
distribution. On the other hand, the true productivity
in both models is observed to grow with time. Obvi-
ously this increase is much higher for the continuity
model, where the promotion preserves, at least par-
tially, the wi values, so that talent and competencies
12
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Figure 5: Improvement of characteristics of externally hired agents due to pre-hiring selection process, compared to
simple random drawing of a single agent characteristics. The red line denotes the individual perceived productivity,
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productivity w′i = wi − pi of the selected candidates, decreasing with the company susceptibility, but still higher than
the value of w0 − pmax/2 = 0.7 expected for a single random new hire.
are not lost.
C. Global characteristics
We shall focus now on the remaining model controls:
the post-promotion effectiveness model (Peter or con-
tinuity) and the organization susceptibility to internal
self promotion, C. Both factors play a crucial role in
the evolution of the organization effectiveness. Let
us discuss first the differences between the two post-
promotion models. The continuity model, even in the
presence of strong susceptibility to internal PR, pre-
dicts improvement of the individual productivity wi
with time at higher levels of organization. Selection of
best (perceived) performers coupled with limited “in-
heritance” of the individual productivity significantly
improves the average values, and as result, leads to
much higher values of overall true productivity than
in the Peter model.
The difference between the productivity in continu-
ity model and Peter model can be as high as 8 times,
as shown in Fig. 12. Selection process for the conti-
nuity model, even for very large values of susceptibil-
ity C (when agents with high focus on self-promotion
are at advantage), leads to performance better than
13
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Figure 6: Comparison of the overall organization performance WTOT evolution with and without external hiring pre-
selection. Upper panel - continuity model, lower panel, Peter model. Lines for several values of company susceptibility
are shown.
for the random assignment of agent capacities – but
lower than the neutral configuration, when internal
politics plays no role. For the Peter model at large C
values the evolution may lead to decrease of produc-
tivity from the starting random configuration! This
seems to be a very bad sign for any organization. For
some combinations of parameters this decrease, hap-
pening over a short period of less than 10 quarters,
diminished the productivity by a factor of 2 (see, for
example, Figs. 22,21).
D. Conclusions
The general results of the simulations are not sur-
prising (just as the original observations of Peter
and Adams were not surprising). Everyday observa-
tions show that there are many organizations, big and
small, commercial and governmental, where promo-
tions and demotions follow political ploys and not the
real capability of an employee to fulfill specific roles.
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And it is quite obvious to both internal and external
observers, that the performance of these organizations
may be far from optimal. Thus the model has no “dis-
covery” value, but is, more or less, a mathematical
toy, reflecting some aspects of the social reality. Ob-
viously, it misses a lot of factors that are present in
real life: individuality and creativeness of the leaders;
innovative, market disruptive products or ideas; well
established processes and organizational culture that
effectively guide individual players; capacity to change
the organizational form to adapt to new challenges.
All these can be crucial in determining the success or
a failure of the organization. On the other hand, the
processes related to promotion and internal politics in-
cluded in the model are present in almost all types of
organizations and can negatively impact their results.
The main idea behind the model is to look for some
simple controls that could allow some general policy
suggestions – as it turns out some model parameters
are more important than others. For example, the
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presence of blame-shifting influences the overall per-
formance only to a minor degree. Moreover, such self-
preservation instincts are natural for managers, and
it s very hard to avoid them. Another model vari-
able, degree of pre-screening of external candidates,
provides much higher influence on the resulting pro-
ductivity (especially in the continuity model). But
for most of modern organizations such competitive na-
ture of hiring is already present, so there is little room
for improvement here. The two major factors are the
capability to preserve the skills and efficiency of an
employee after the promotion and susceptibility of an
organization to self-promotion, or, in other words, ca-
pacity to recognize the real values. Here the differ-
ences in overall productivity can be as high as an order
of magnitude. Thus, the model suggests that organi-
zations should focus on measures eliminating negative
effects due to Peter Principle and to self-promotion.
Such measures could include:
• Using measurable and objective criteria for em-
ployee evaluation. This is relatively easy for
some areas (for example in sales departments),
but rather difficult in creative environments (sci-
entific research, software engineering). Yet de-
spite the difficulty, such standards would de-
crease the employee’s drive to use political skills
for self-promotion, instead of focusing on the
needed tasks.
• Giving prospective candidates for promotion
tasks related to the nature of duties at the higher
level (e.g. temporary management of small
groups, responsibility for analysis of results and
preparing directions for action for workgroups
and departments etc.) and measuring results of
such assignments. These results should be used
when considering promotion, as they estimate
the productivity at the higher level, and thus
decrease the effect of Peter Principle.
• Introduction of horizontal advancement paths,
in which employees who do not fit into the tra-
ditional promotion model (for example brilliant
engineers lacking managerial skills) would still
be able to achieve satisfaction within a company,
without falling prey to the Peter Principle trap.
Even a moderate decrease of the company suscepti-
bility to political ploys, and improvement of the “heri-
tability” of skills after promotion may lead to dramatic
improvement of overall productivity, not by single per-
centage points but by a significant factor.
E. Model extensions
The initial model presented here can be expanded
in several directions. The best source of improvement
of the model would be when the computer simulation
could be coupled with some “microscopic” sociology
studies (for example interviews focused on measuring
the payoff of political activities within the organiza-
tion). Especially, if one could provide comparative
studies of general effectiveness of organizations built
upon different social models.
The model itself is quite flexible and allows many
improvements. Such extensions of the computer
model would still miss the effects due to individuality
of participants and specific nature of the organization
but bring the simulated strictures still closer to reality.
For example it would be interesting to study results
of changes in organization policies related to promo-
tion and susceptibility to self-interests in a “mature”
environment. In such simulations an organization re-
sulting from some years of evolution under one set of
parameters would be used as the starting point of a
new simulation, for example with a changed value of
C. This would correspond to corrective measures un-
dertaken by top management, especially after a major
change. The main question of such studies would be
to determine, for example, the expected improvements
due to lowering of susceptibility or the time it takes
to see such improvement take the effect.
To make the model more realistic one might divide
the organization into a few ‘divisions’. Promotion
within a division (e.g. sales, marketing, manufactur-
ing) should be based on a common sense hypothesis,
as a lot of workload remains the same, so the effec-
tive results should be changing only partially. On the
other hand, promotion across the departments should
be less frequent and the new value of raw productivity
would be totally uncorrelated.
Yet another direction of further research is the
study of dependence of overall output and effective-
ness per employee in a growing organization – as most
of real life organizations are dynamically changing
their size.
The model can also be improved by including ef-
fects of employee dissatisfaction and restlessness when
they are not promoted. In the current paper, the ex-
ternal candidates come from an infinite pool of agents
with random characteristics. In real life they would
be the people from appropriate levels of other orga-
nizations (usually quite similar to the studied one).
By symmetry, this effects should be included in the
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study: a process of agents leaving the company to join
other ones. In contrast with firing of the worst per-
ceived performers, here the agents most likely to leave
would be the ones who have relatively high opinion of
themselves and willingness to seek new opportunities.
These qualities, in the first approximation are related
to the self-promotion drive pi. The probability should
increase with time spent at the same position. As
a result, increases of productivity introduced by the
pre-screening of external candidates would be coun-
terbalanced by the outflow of the restless, disgruntled
employees.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of average 〈pi〉k and 〈wi〉k values for the continuity model; 5 levels of 5 positions in a
workgroup, with blame-shifting and pre-selection of external candidates (4NH).
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Figure 9: Time evolution of average 〈pi〉k and 〈wi〉k values for the Peter model; 5 levels of 5 positions in a workgroup,
with blame-shifting and pre-selection of external candidates (4NH).
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Figure 10: Time evolution of average 〈pi〉k and 〈wi〉k values for the continuity model; 5 levels of 5 positions in a
workgroup, with blame-shifting and no pre-selection of external candidates (1NH).
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Figure 11: Time evolution of average 〈pi〉k and 〈wi〉k values for the Peter model; 5 levels of 5 positions in a workgroup,
with blame-shifting and no pre-selection of external candidates (1NH).
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Figure 12: Comparison of overall organization effectiveness for the continuity and Peter models for various combinations
of input parameters: with or without blame-shifting and with or without pre-selection of newhires (4NH and 1NH).
Hierarchy with 5 levels and 5 positions in a workgroup has been used in this simulation.
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Appendix: Detailed simulation results
In this section we present more detailed simulation results for several sets of model parameters. We focus
on the time evolution of average organization productivity (starting from a random configuration), dependence
of this productivity on the susceptibility C after 3, 5 and 15 years of evolution and similar dependence of the
average pi and wi values at various levels of the organization. Overall productivity has been normalized to that
of a “neutral” organization, in which all employees have neutral productivity (wi = 1), and no self-promotion
(pi = 0), which means that the managers neither increase nor decrease their team output. In such neutral
configuration, the productivity is given by the sum of work done by the workers at the lowest level. Such
normalization allows to see the effects independently to organization size and number of levels.
23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
O
ve
ra
ll
re
su
lts
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Quarter
C=0.01
C=1
C=2
C=3
C=4
C=5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
O
ve
ra
ll
re
su
lts
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
Year 5
Year 16
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Av
er
ag
e
p i
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 5
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 16
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
Av
er
ag
e
w
i
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 5
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 16
Figure 13: Simulation results for the continuity model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4 external
candidates (4NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 14: Simulation results for the continuity model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4
external candidates (4NH) and no blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall
productivity WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size.
Lower panels: dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 15: Simulation results for the continuity model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. No pre-selection for external
candidates (1NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 16: Simulation results for the continuity model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. No pre-selection for
external candidates (1NH) and no blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall
productivity WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size.
Lower panels: dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 17: Simulation results for the continuity model, 4 layers, 9 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4 external
candidates (4NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 18: Simulation results for the continuity model, 4 layers, 9 positions in a workgroup. No pre-selection for external
candidates (1NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 19: Simulation results for the Peter model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4 external
candidates (4NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 20: Simulation results for the Peter model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. No pre-selection of external
candidates (1NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 21: Simulation results for the Peter model, 5 layers, 5 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4 external
candidates (4NH) and no no blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall
productivity WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size.
Lower panels: dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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Figure 22: Simulation results for the Peter model, 4 layers, 9 positions in a workgroup. Pre-selection from 4 external
candidates (4NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
33
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
O
ve
ra
ll
re
su
lts
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Quarter
C=0.01
C=1
C=2
C=3
C=4
C=5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
O
ve
ra
ll
re
su
lts
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
Year 5
Year 16
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Av
er
ag
e
p i
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 5
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 16
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Av
er
ag
e
w
i
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 3
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 5
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
Company susceptibility C
Year 16
Figure 23: Simulation results for the Peter model, 4 layers, 9 positions in a workgroup. No pre-selection for external
candidates (1NH) and blame-shift process present. Upper panels: time evolution and dependence of overall productivity
WTOT on organization susceptibility C, divided by productivity of "neutral" organization of the same size. Lower panels:
dependence of average pi and wi values on C at the end of the third, fifth and 16th year of evolution.
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